


AFMUN UNSC

UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL
Gözde Ümit

UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL
Emre Yılmaz



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1. Letter from the Secretaries-General

Distinguished Delegates,

It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to AFMUN'26. As the Secretaries-General, we are truly pleased to see this conference once again bring together so many bright and motivated young individuals who believe in dialogue, diplomacy, and cooperation.

First and foremost, we would like to extend our sincere thanks to our academic and organization teams. This conference would not have been possible without their dedication and commitment, and we are deeply grateful for the effort they have put in.

We are living in a time where it is almost impossible to ignore what is happening around the world. Many of us often find ourselves thinking that certain situations could have been handled differently, or questioning the decisions that were made. However, AFMUN is not only a place for reflection, but also a platform for initiative. Through our committees, you will have the opportunity to express your ideas, challenge perspectives, and engage in meaningful discussions. As young people in today's world, your voice is truly important.

We hope this conference will be both inspiring and memorable for all of you. And as we say, a realm cannot endure without its sovereign. Yours truly,

Kaan Muştu & Ömer T. Demirel

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2. Letters from the Under-Secretaries-General

Esteemed participants of this committee,

I would like to welcome you all to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) of AFMUN26. I will be serving as your Under-Secretary General during the long awaited three days of this prestigious conference. Thanks to our dear Executive Team's hard work and commitment to this conference, we are able to gather in this committee. I would like to extend my gratitudes to my dearest Co-Under Secretary General and friend, Emre Yılmaz, for his hard work throughout the preparation of our committee . I am indeed very grateful that I was and will be able to work with him in this committee.

I am hoping from the bottom of my heart that this committee will be an extremely productive, pleasing and a very memorable experience for all of us. Our Agenda Item is "Addressing the questions which have emerged from the Sudanese Civil War". We are expecting you to create solutions related to the topics you discussed upon, collaborate with your fellow delegates and elaborate your ideas to create an efficient Resolution Paper.

Besides reading this Study Guide, we are expecting you to further research upon our topic and be prepared. Your research may contain information about your country's status, international actions and possible solutions for the issue.

You may contact me with any inquiries via email.

@umitgozde23@gmail.com

Best Regards,

Gözde Ümit, Under Secretary General of UNSC

Distinguished Delegates,

As your Co-Under-Secretary-General, Emre Yılmaz, I welcome you to AFMUN26' United Nations Security Council.

This committee was founded by my one and only Co-Under-Secretary General Gözde Ümit, and I would like to show my gratitude to her for her contributions on the committee. Our agenda focuses on the topic of addressing the questions which have emerged from the Sudanese Civil War. This study guide contains highly important information regarding our agenda. I would be pleased if each and every one of you studied the entire guide. Also, keep in mind that this guide shouldn't be your only source of information. Because of the complexity of the committee, I highly recommend conducting further research to gain more comprehensive knowledge that you can use during your debates.

I sincerely wish this committee could be an experience that contributes to your debate and document writing skills, understanding of our world's current problems, and, well, your MUN career.

If you have any kind of questions in mind, do not hesitate to contact me. You can reach me through my email, dremreyilmaz0707@gmail.com

3. Introduction to the Committee

**KEEP IN MIND THAT THIS COMMITTEE
SIMULATES THE 2026 ANNUAL SESSION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL.**

3.1. History of the Committee

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was established in 1945 as one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security while having the power to use international force. It was created in response to the devastation of World War II, aiming to prevent future conflicts via planned security and military interventions and responses. The structure of the council was designed to reflect the geopolitical realities of the time, granting five major World powers [China, France, the Soviet Union (now represented as Russia), the United Kingdom, and the United States] permanent membership. Since its dawn, the UNSC has played a crucial role in addressing global security challenges, including Cold War issues, regional conflicts and acts of aggression internationally . Over the decades, its authority has been expanded by the UN to include peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism measures, and the enforcement of international sanctions.

3.2. Functions of the Committee

The Security Council has broad and legally binding powers under the UN Charter, giving it the power to take actions in response to threats that endanger international stability. It is responsible for authorizing peacekeeping missions, imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions and approving military interventions when necessary. The Security Council also plays a role in conflict prevention, facilitating diplomatic negotiations and recommending solutions to disputes, while acting as an arbiter power. Its resolutions are legally binding on all UN member states, giving it significant influence over global affairs. The UNSC organizes meetings when there is a need of addressing crises and its ability to act swiftly has been effective in managing conflicts in regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. However, while the Council has been successful in many instances, its effectiveness is often challenged by political disagreements among its members.

3.3. *The Veto Right*

A defining feature of the Security Council is the veto power granted to its five permanent members. This mechanism allows any of these nations to block the adoption of any substantive resolution, regardless of the majority vote. The veto power was established to ensure that the most powerful states remained committed to the UN's objectives while preventing single sided actions that could undermine global stability. However, it has also been a source of controversy, as it can lead to a deadlock while decision making, particularly when permanent members have conflicting national interests. The use of the veto has been widely debated, with calls for change to make the Council more representative and effective.

A permanent member's abstention or absence does not count as a veto. A "procedural" decision (such as changing the meeting agenda or inviting a non-member to sit at a UNSC meeting) also cannot be vetoed.

4. Introduction to the Agenda Item

The civil war which took place in Sudan in April 2023 has turned out to be an internationally significant humanitarian and political crisis of larger scale, which is much more than the simple military conflict. The power tussle that has now developed between the Sudanese Armed Forces (which is the official army of the state) and the Rapid Support Forces (which is a paramilitary organisation) raises pertinent issues related to the institutional future of the country.

This conflict stems from the disruption of the process of civilian and democratic transition, which was planned after the fall of the Omar al-Bashir regime in 2019. This issue was further aggravated due to the differences in the matter of reforming and integrating the security sector amongst the stakeholders post the military takeover of 2021. This issue signifies the need to deconstruct the institutions of military domination and transfer the governance to the civilian leadership.

In addition to this, the armed conflict that continues even today has produced a major humanitarian crisis which is of great importance for the whole world and has produced massive forced migration and severe food shortages. It is crucial to deal with the problem in a way that will make sure that humanitarian aid will not be used as some kind of tool of strategy; security of the international corridors will have to be ensured; civilian efforts of the locals will have to be encouraged. What is more important is that the regional powers who are driven by their own strategic and economic interests should stop supporting the parties to the conflict with logistical and financial help. Also, there is a need to make strict adherence to arms embargoes and hold diplomatic talks in a common international forum.

It is quite clear that there is a way out of the Sudanese crisis if an unconditional ceasefire is made and unrestricted humanitarian aid access is provided and the constitutional order is restored through the will of the people.

5. Historical Background

5.1. Post-Bashir Power Struggle

The rivalry between various Sudanese military and civilian groups vying for power after Bashir can be viewed as a case of the collapse of the post-authoritarian transition of a fragile state which saw different security institutions and civilian camps fighting for control over the state and eventually plunging the country into civil war.

The Fall of Bashir and Military Takeover (April 2019)

After an extensive period of street protests calling for democracy, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), under the command of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, overthrew the dictator Omar al-Bashir who ruled the country for decades. As part of its efforts to handle the political crisis, the military created a Transitional Military Council (TMC), whereas civilians continued to protest in public places demanding a full transfer of power to the civilian administration.

The Unstable Power-Sharing Deal (2019-2021)

Under increasing external pressure, the military, on the one hand, and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the name of the civilian camp, on the other, signed a constitution document in August 2019. The creation of a joint Sovereignty

Council headed by General Burhan took place along with the naming of Abdalla Hamdok, a civilian economist, as the Prime Minister.

The agreement hence constituted a tragic blunder in judgment whereby the two rival armies within the same state were formed through the recognition of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti).

The October 2021 Military Coup

As the scheduled deadline for the handover of the presidency of the Sovereignty Council to a civilian leader approached, General Burhan and Hemedti instigated a joint military coup on 25 October 2021. The arrest of PM Hamdok, the dissolution of the civilian government, and the interruption of the democratic transition have been pivotal moments in the analysis.

The Security Sector Friction (2022–2023)

In the absence of a civilian intermediary, the alliance between the two military leaders swiftly devolved into a zero-sum contest for absolute dominance. In the late months of 2022, the Framework talks proposed the integration of the RSF into the regular SAF army. SAF advocated for a compressed two-year timeline under the command of the army, while Hemedti called for a 10-year timeline with the establishment of independent command structures.

5.2. Structural Riffs

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) competed for dominance over Sudan's primary state revenues. The SAF controlled military-industrial organisations, while the RSF maintained control over profitable gold mining networks and foreign financial channels.

Outbreak of War (April 2023)

By April 2023, negotiations concerning the reform of the security sector had reached an impasse. Tensions over troop deployments escalated into full-scale armed conflict in Khartoum on 15 April 2023, transforming a political struggle for transition into an all-out civil war between the SAF and the RSF.

6. Key Actors and External Factors

6.1. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)

The SAF, led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and dominated by members of Arab tribes from central Sudan, includes the Land Force, Sudanese Navy, Sudanese Air Force, SAF Military Intelligence, and Border Guards, and the Central Reserve Police (CRP) also referred to as ‘*Abu Tira*’.

After the outbreak of the conflict, Al-Burhan and the local authorities imposed or expanded the state of emergency declared in 2021 to most states, granting security forces extensive powers and immunity in the course of their duties. This confirms the SAF and its allied groups as the main state actor in the country. Air superiority has been a key advantage for the SAF, which has enhanced its capabilities since late 2023 and early 2024 with combat drones acquired from Türkiye and Iran. Additionally, the SAF reportedly received arms shipments and aerial support from Egypt.

The SAF strengthened its operational capabilities, including personnel numbers, aviation systems, and defence industries. However, it continued to face structural challenges such as lack of discipline, political infighting, and competing personal interests. Since 2005, the SAF has been subject to sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution 1591, including an arms embargo due to its involvement in the Darfur conflict.

The Sudanese army oversees a network of national and international companies across various sectors, including defence, agriculture, banking, mining, transport, construction, and private security.

6.2. Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are a powerful paramilitary group in Sudan led by General Hemedti. The present Sudanese Civil War is primarily driven by the power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces.

The group first emerged in the early 2000s from the Janjaweed, a collection of Arab militias mobilised by former dictator Omar al-Bashir to suppress rebellions in Darfur through widespread ethnic violence. In 2013, Bashir officially restructured these militias into the RSF, with the stated aim of providing a personal defence force for his regime. By 2017, Sudanese legislation formally recognised them as an independent security force accountable directly to the president, thereby enabling them to operate alongside the regular army without being subject to army command.

This shows clearly that the RSF has over time been able to attain considerable financial independence and regional influence. The rebels managed to take control of

some parts of the gold mining areas in the Darfur region and northern Sudan through international connections that have enabled them to export gold from the areas, which has provided them with funds and enabled them to recruit new fighters. Additionally, the increase in their international exposure has been through sending thousands of mercenaries to fight in Yemen and Libya, earning them money internationally.

In the present civil war, the RSF plays a pivotal and formidable role. In contrast to the conventional Sudanese army, the RSF has a specialisation in mobile urban warfare. The RSF utilises fast-moving pickup trucks equipped with heavy weaponry to seize key neighbourhoods in Khartoum and major cities across Darfur. The internal structure of these communities is characterised by a high degree of organisation, which is firmly rooted in tribal and familial allegiances to Hemedti.

During the course of the conflict, the RSF has been implicated in a number of egregious human rights violations, including mass atrocities, widespread sexual violence, systemic looting, and targeted ethnic cleansing against non-Arab groups in West Darfur.

With a complex financial network controlling the gold market and engaging in mercenary operations abroad such as Yemen and Libya, the RSF developed independent sources of income. The RSF also received support and weapons supplies from Russia's former Wagner Group, as well as from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its main goal is to seize control of the security sector and establish a new army, replacing the SAF.

6.3. Regional Alliances and Foreign Influence

Neighbouring States: Security, Borders and Spillover

Sudan's immediate neighbours, which are Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad and South Sudan; view the conflict through the lens of border security, refugee inflows and long-standing territorial and water disputes. It is clear how tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the al-Fashaga border triangle and unresolved conflicts in Ethiopia and South Sudan shape each neighbour's perception of the war.

Egypt has historically maintained close ties with Sudan's regular army and continues to favour the SAF as a partner that can help protect its interests in Nile waters and regional security.

Ethiopia and Eritrea, by contrast, have pursued more complex and sometimes opaque relationships with Sudanese actors, influenced by their own security calculations and previous alliances during the Tigray conflict.

Chad, which shares ethnic and economic linkages with Darfur, has been accused in some analyses of functioning as a logistical corridor for arms and supplies, although N'Djamena denies direct involvement.

These neighbouring states thus play a dual role: they host large numbers of Sudanese refugees and are directly threatened by cross-border insecurity, yet their alliances and security interests can also reinforce the conflict dynamics inside Sudan.

Gulf Powers and the Red Sea Arena

Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are among the most influential external actors. The SETA "One Year at War" report underlines that Sudan's strategic location on the Red Sea, combined with its gold reserves and agricultural potential, has made it a focal point of Gulf competition.

After April 2023, the roles of Saudi Arabia and the UAE diverged: Riyadh has tried to position itself as a stabilizing mediator, hosting ceasefire talks in Jeddah, while numerous reports indicate that the UAE has supplied financial and military support to the RSF, including through networks linked to gold exports. These findings are echoed in broader geopolitical analyses that describe Sudan as part of a “Gulf chessboard”, where Abu Dhabi and Riyadh project influence through alliances with local armed actors.

Turkey and Qatar have also been associated more closely with political and social forces linked to the former Islamist regime, and thus perceived as leaning towards actors closer to the SAF. This complex web of Gulf engagement makes it difficult to separate mediation efforts from strategic competition along the Red Sea.

Global Powers, Mediation and International Inertia

Beyond the region, global powers have played a significant, if often inconsistent, role. The United States and Saudi Arabia jointly sponsored the Jeddah talks, seeking ceasefires and humanitarian access, yet their leverage has been limited and ceasefires repeatedly broken. It should be considered that Washington’s influence is constrained by competing priorities and its need to balance relations with both Gulf allies and regional partners.

European states and the European Union have focused largely on humanitarian funding, sanctions, and support for African-led mediation efforts. However, the fragmentation of mediation platforms which includes Jeddah, African Union, IGAD and other initiatives, has produced a “failure of mediation”, in which no single framework commands enough legitimacy or unified external backing to pressure the warring parties.

Russia, meanwhile, seeks access to Sudan's gold and a potential Red Sea naval facility, building on longstanding security ties and previous cooperation with Wagner-linked networks. While the full extent of current Russian or post-Wagner involvement is debated, how Sudan's war has become entangled in broader global rivalries, including those linked to the war in Ukraine must be highlighted.

China remains more cautious, largely prioritising stability for its investments and shipping routes, and avoiding overt military entanglement. Nonetheless, both Russia and China have been criticised for blocking or watering down stronger measures in the UN Security Council.

7. Current Issues and Challenges

7.1. *Displacement and Refugee Movements*

The civil war in Sudan has led to what is currently the world's largest displacement crisis, with more than 14 million people forced to flee their homes. Whilst the vast majority of those displaced remain within the country, millions have crossed the borders of neighbouring countries in a bid to save their lives and have become refugees.

Internal displacement within the country's borders, coupled with the spread of conflict, is forcing civilians to relocate time and again. In particular, some 9 million people fleeing areas of intense conflict—such as Khartoum, Kordofan and Darfur—are struggling to survive in safe areas where humanitarian aid is insufficient and the threat of famine is looming. In some areas where the fighting has relatively

subsided, however, civilians are attempting to return to their homes despite the destroyed infrastructure and inadequate services.

Chad, South Sudan and Egypt are bearing the brunt of the cross-border influx of refugees. Whilst civilians fleeing ethnic violence in Darfur are seeking refuge in border camps in Chad in large numbers, thousands of South Sudanese who had previously fled to Sudan are also returning to their own country due to the fighting. Egypt, meanwhile, is a key destination, particularly for urban populations and families...

Egypt, meanwhile, has become a key destination, particularly for urban populations and families; however, the strict visa policies in place have led to major build-ups at border areas and humanitarian crises. In addition, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, Libya and Uganda are also hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees.

The key factors exacerbating this crisis of mass displacement are famine, the blocking of aid corridors, and the use of humanitarian aid by the parties as a means of exerting pressure. The refusal of the warring parties to allow the passage of food and medical aid leaves hundreds of thousands of people stranded along the border, at risk of epidemics, malnutrition and starvation

7.2. Human Rights Violations

Reports by international independent observers and the United Nations indicate that the ongoing civil war in Sudan is characterised by egregious violations of human rights, which are tantamount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The primary

parties to the conflict, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, are systematically violating international humanitarian law by directly targeting civilians.

One of the most severe aspects of the war is the direct attacks on civilians and ethnically motivated violence. The Sudanese Armed Forces have been accused of causing significant civilian casualties through the use of air strikes on residential areas and infrastructure, as well as heavy artillery fire. It is evident that the Rapid Support Forces, in conjunction with the militias operating in their alliance, are perpetrating acts of ethnic cleansing, mass killings and extrajudicial executions against non-Arab groups.

This is particularly evident in the case of the Masalit community in West Darfur. It is evident that both sides are engaging in the arbitrary detention of activists, journalists and civilians whom they suspect of collaborating with the opposing forces. These individuals are subjected to torture in secret detention centres or are forced to disappear.

Furthermore, conflict-related sexual violence and the use of starvation as a weapon of war are exacerbating the humanitarian dimension of the crisis. Whilst the Rapid Support Forces are using tactics such as mass rape and sexual enslavement of women in the areas they have captured as a means of terror, healthcare workers attempting to assist these victims are also being directly targeted. At the same time, by blocking the passage of humanitarian aid convoys and looting food stores and water infrastructure, the parties are turning hunger into a means of coercion and leaving the population to face a catastrophic famine.

Finally, the deliberate dismantling of the health and education systems is making it impossible for civilians to survive. A large proportion of hospitals have been destroyed by air strikes or converted into military headquarters, whilst healthcare workers have been killed or rendered unable to carry out their duties. The

International Criminal Court and United Nations bodies, stating that these acts committed in Sudan constitute war crimes, are continuing their efforts to bring those responsible to justice and to impose sanctions on the parties involved.

8. Pathways to Peace

The War underscores the urgent necessity for comprehensive pathways to peace that address the structural, socioeconomic and political roots of the conflict. The power struggle between the SAF and RSF has devastated the country's institutions, worsened ethnic divisions, meaning the need for a sustainable resolution contingent upon coordinated international and national efforts that prioritize the will of the Sudanese people over external strategic interests. It's clear that the past resolution and stress decreasing strategies, such as Jeddah talks, were sufficient and have stumbled due to broken ceasefires and inadequate enforcement mechanisms; so a more robust, inclusive framework that integrates the African Union, International Authority on Development(IGAD), and United Nations initiatives into a unified platform. With the cooperation and commitment of all the stakeholders on the de-escalation procedures, it is possible to eliminate the outside catalyzators of the ongoing heat(which would be the parallel military economies), and ensure accountability for violations of international humanitarian law.

8.1. Immediate Ceasefire and Humanitarian Access

An unconditional and verifiable ceasefire represents the foundational step toward any meaningful resolution of the Sudanese crisis, one that must be monitored through robust international mechanisms including the deployment of neutral observers and the establishment of demilitarized zones in key urban centers and major

cities. The warring parties must be pressured through targeted sanctions and arms embargo enforcement to halt all offensive operations, including aerial bombardments and mobile assaults that have indiscriminately targeted civilian populations and infrastructure. Humanitarian access corridors must be secured without delay, allowing unrestricted delivery of food, medical supplies, and essential services to the millions facing acute famine and disease outbreaks, particularly in displacement camps where malnutrition and epidemics pose an existential threat. International actors, including the United Nations and regional organizations, should coordinate the protection of aid workers and civilian convoys, preventing the weaponization of humanitarian assistance as a tool of strategic leverage by either faction. Furthermore, the restoration of essential services such as water, electricity, and healthcare facilities, many of which have been destroyed or repurposed for military use, is critical to alleviating immediate suffering and building confidence in the peace process. The involvement of local civilian initiatives and community leaders in overseeing aid distribution would further ensure that relief efforts empower Sudanese society rather than perpetuating dependency.

8.2. Restoration of Civilian-Led Democratic Governance

The long-term stability of Sudan hinges on the restoration of a civilian-led democratic governance structure that revives the transitional process interrupted by the 2021 military coup and subsequent outbreak of full-scale war. This necessitates the reconstitution of a sovereign council and transitional government inclusive of the FFC and other civilian stakeholders, with clear timelines for elections and constitutional reforms that dismantle the dual military architecture currently dividing the security sector. Security sector reform must prioritize the integration of the RSF into a unified national army under civilian oversight, with provisions for accountability mechanisms

addressing past oppressions and preventing the revival of paramilitary autonomy or tribal patronage networks. International support should focus on capacity-building for civilian institutions, anti-corruption measures targeting the economic empires of both SAF and RSF, and the protection of journalists, activists, and human rights defenders who have faced arbitrary detention. Regional powers and global actors must refrain from proxy support that prolongs the conflict, instead channeling resources toward inclusive national dialogues that address ethnic grievances,

9. Questions to Be Addressed

1. How can the United Nations Security Council effectively enforce an arms embargo and targeted sanctions against external actors providing military or financial support to the SAF or RSF, while balancing the interests of permanent members?
2. In what ways can international humanitarian organizations secure unrestricted access to conflict zones in Darfur and Khartoum, particularly in light of reports of aid weaponization and attacks on relief convoys?
3. What role can regional organizations such as the African Union and IGAD play in mediating a comprehensive ceasefire, and how can their efforts be collaborated with parallel initiatives like the Jeddah platform to avoid fragmentation?
4. What strategies should be employed to support the restoration of democratic civilian governance, ensuring broad inclusion of youth, women, and marginalized communities in the transitional process?

5. How can host countries in the region receive adequate support to manage refugee inflows without exacerbating local instabilities or border tensions?
6. To what extent should post-conflict reconstruction efforts prioritize economic reforms targeting the military-industrial and gold-mining networks controlled by the SAF and RSF?
7. How can the protection of civilians, including measures against conflict-related sexual violence and arbitrary detentions, be operationalized through enhanced mandates for peacekeeping or monitoring missions?

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