


Sekme 1

AFMUN FDISEC

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AFMUN'26
F-DISEC: CALL OF DUTY STUDY GUIDE

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***Agenda Item: Reducing the Political and Military
Power of Private Military Companies***

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1. Letter from the Secretariat

Distinguished Delegates,

It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to AFMUN'26. As the Secretaries-General, we are truly pleased to see this conference once again bring together so many bright and motivated young individuals who believe in dialogue, diplomacy, and cooperation.

First and foremost, we would like to extend our sincere thanks to our academic and organization teams. This conference would not have been possible without their dedication and commitment, and we are deeply grateful for the effort they have put in.

We are living in a time where it is almost impossible to ignore what is happening around the world. Many of us often find ourselves thinking that certain situations could have been handled differently, or questioning the decisions that were made. However, AFMUN is not only a place for reflection, but also a platform for initiative. Through our committees, you will have the opportunity to express your ideas, challenge perspectives, and engage in meaningful discussions. As young people in today's world, your voice is truly important.

We hope this conference will be both inspiring and memorable for all of you.

And as we say, a realm cannot endure without its sovereign.

Yours truly,

Kaan Muştu & Ömer T. Demirel

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2. Letter from the Under-Secretaries General

Dear executive team, fellow participants and prominent delegates,

Our name is Efe Deniz Yağcı and Ramazan Rahmi Özcan and we will be serving as your Co-Under Secretary General in this prestigious conference.

It is an honor for us to introduce and welcome you all to the committee we have been dreaming about ever since our time as a delegate. We wish all of you to study upon this guide that we have worked so hard for and I give my promise to you that this guide will have the necessary information to make you an economist.

Last but not least, we want to give our thanks to our friends in the executive team for making this conference happen and also giving me the chance to make a wonderful committee with our brother and academic assistant Doruk Sapmaz.

We can't wait for the opportunity to meet you all in person if you have any questions about the guide please let us know.

Sincerely,

Efe Deniz Yağcı and Ramazan Rahmi Özcan

3. Letter from the Academic Assistant

Hello everybody my name is Doruk Sapmaz and I will be serving you guys as you Academic Assistants for the remainder of this conference. I'm currently a student at the University of Pamukkale and studying English Language and Literature.

We know this guide is short but this guide really has it all for you to study and debate about. Do not worry about that part. As for the question that kind of makes us think, the committee as a whole will act like any other General Assembly committee; however, the timeline of the committee will be the timeline of the game itself.

So the committee is just a normal GA committee with a more exciting agenda item and timeline. Before I finish the letter I would like to thank my brothers and my Under-Secretary Generals, Efe Deniz Yağcı and Ramazan Rahmi Özcan. Thank you for always relying on me and the executive team for making this conference happen.

I can't wait for the opportunity to meet all of you in person and I will be leaving my contact information below so feel free to contact me at any time.

Sincerely,
Doruk Sapmaz

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4. Introduction to the committee

The United Nations Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was created as the first of six committees for the General Assembly when the UN Charter was signed in 1945. Because of this, DISEC is also known as the First Committee. DISEC was set up to provide countries with a space to discuss issues related to peace and security. This is one of the core responsibilities of the General Assembly as enshrined in the UN Charter. Article 11 reads that the General Assembly “may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security,” including disarmament and arms control. DISEC can also make recommendations to the UN members or the Security Council. While DISEC cannot directly influence the Security Council’s decisions, it can suggest topics for the Security Council to consider. DISEC works closely with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), which was created in 1998. The UNODA focuses on all levels of disarmament, such as nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, and helps DISEC achieve its disarmament goals.

5. Introduction to the Agenda Item

5.1 What are Private Military Companies?

A private military company (PMC) often used interchangeably with the broader term private military and security company (PMSC), is a private company that purveys armed combat or security services -or both-, with personnel referred to as “security contractors” or “private military contractors.” Due to their wide field of exercise of work, the term private security company (PSC) is often used alongside PMC to capture this range. A Private Military Company is commonly understood as a commercial organism selling military services to governments, international organizations, or corporations in high-risk environments, whereas a Private Security Company (PSC) focuses barely on guarding, access control, and protective services in non-conflict positions.

PMC’s accumulate political leverage in some stable ways such as letting states seek for with no deniability which means no uniforms, no official casualty numbers and no parliamentary oversights triggered. They get paid with mining rights, oil, timber, gold rather than cash and this directly ties them to the host countries’ economy. And in view of this the weak states’ only means of security becomes PMCS. Private military and security companies have a history of violating IHL and IHRL, and yet accountability remains weak owing to regulatory gaps and the lack of an international binding instrument.

PMCS in a legal framework are distinct from mercenaries (a narrow category under international law defined by individual fighters motivated purely by private gain) even when they are doing the exact same work and this sometimes leads to governmental issues because in some way they are doing the same work that governments are doing.

As an exemplification, there are some active PMCS in today's time like Russia's "Wagner Group", they are now fully absorbed into the aforementioned called Africa Corps.

The reason why PMCS are legally differentiated from different things is that several overlapping categories are treated very differently within the law itself even though in practice their activities could seem as if they are nearly identical. Under the 1989 UN Mercenary Convention and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, a "Mercenary" is narrowly defined as someone recruited to fight in an armed conflict, motivated substantially by private financial gain, and not a national of any party to the conflict, a definition so hard to satisfy in court that most PMCs sidestep it entirely by structuring themselves as legitimate registered corporations with formal government contracts, even when their personnel's work looks identical to mercenary activity. Under International humanitarian law, PMCs are defined functionally rather than by self-description: they are private business concerns providing military and/or security services, regardless of how they describe themselves, and such services include the provision of armed guards, protection of convoys and buildings, maintenance and operation of weapons systems, prisoner detention, and advice or training of local forces. Markedly, none of the global treaties officially "licenses" PMCs; instead, obligations stack across international humanitarian law, human rights law, and national laws enacting to the home state -where the company is registered-, the territorial state -where the company actively operates-, and the contracting states — the so-called "three state" triangle which underpins current best-practice governance efforts. This regulatory fragmentation explains why PMCs have been able to accumulate asymmetrical political and military leverage relative to the oversight applied to them.

State paramilitaries, like a national guard or gendarmerie, differ in that they're formally part of a state's chain of command and subject to normal military law and oversight, whereas PMCs remain nominally private entities even when a single government is their only client. And private security companies (PSCs) are typically distinguished as lighter-armed, defensive-only outfits guarding buildings, embassies, or corporate compounds rather than combat-capable forces, a distinction that holds up in stable environments but often blurs into PMC territory in active conflict zones.

5.2 The Function of PMC's

PMCs perform a wide range of services that fall along a spectrum from purely logistical support to direct combat involvement. These functions are often grouped into a few broad categories:

Combat and combat support

The most controversial function, this includes direct participation in hostilities, front-line fighting, offensive operations, and tactical support to conventional forces. Executive Outcomes' operations in Angola and Sierra Leone in the 1990s are classic examples, as is Wagner Group's frontline role in Ukraine and various African conflicts today. Firms offering this service sit closest to the legal gray zone of mercenary activity.

Security and protection

This covers static and mobile security work such as guarding military bases, embassies, oil and gas infrastructure, and shipping lanes (notably anti-piracy escort work off the coast of Somalia). It also includes personal protective details for diplomats, executives, and government officials. Blackwater's protection of U.S. State Department personnel in Iraq falls into this category, though the 2007 Nisour Square incident showed how quickly protective work can escalate into combat-like engagement.

Military training and advisory services

Many PMCs are contracted to train foreign militaries and police forces, sometimes as part of official state-to-state defense cooperation. MPRI's training of the Croatian army in the 1990s (widely credited with contributing to the success of Operation Storm) and various U.S. contractor programs training Afghan and Iraqi security forces are examples. This function lets sponsoring states build up allied military capacity without deploying their own uniformed advisors.

5.3 Historical Evolution

The private military company as it exists today is a distinctly post-Cold War phenomenon, though its roots stretch back much further. Mercenary forces have existed for as long as organized warfare itself, from the Greek and Carthaginian mercenaries of antiquity to the Italian condottieri of the Renaissance and the Swiss Guard tradition of hired soldiery in early modern Europe. For centuries, hiring foreign fighters was simply an ordinary feature of statecraft, not a legal or moral anomaly.

The clearest historical case of PMC personnel converting military capacity into direct political power, which is “Wonga Coup.” Simon Mann, who is the co-founder of Sandline International and also Executive Outcomes, devised the 2004 coup attempt against the government of Equatorial Guinea which resulted in unaccomplishment. Mann was arrested with 61 suspected abettors in Zimbabwe while allegedly en route to collect weaponry before meeting a team to launch the coup against President Obiang; his associate Nic du Toit was sentenced a 34 year imprisonment in Equatorial Guinea which is one of Africa's largest oil producers. The case remains a central indication point as an instance of direct assaults on state political power.

That began to change with the rise of the modern nation-state and, in particular, the Peace of Westphalia's emphasis on centralized state control over the means of violence. By the 19th and 20th centuries, the professional national army had become the norm, and the use of independent hired soldiers was increasingly viewed as illegitimate. This shift was reinforced by the chaotic mercenary bands that operated in postcolonial Africa during the 1960s and 1970s; figures like "Mad Mike" Hoare in the Congo helped cement the mercenary's reputation as a destabilizing, freelance actor operating outside any state's control. This era is what prompted the 1977 OAU Convention and the 1989 UN Mercenary Convention, both aimed at criminalizing that older model.

The modern PMC industry emerged in the 1990s, largely as a response to two simultaneous pressures: the post-Cold War drawdown of standing militaries, which released a large pool of trained personnel into the private sector, and a wave of weak-state conflicts, especially in Africa and the Balkans, where governments needed military capability but lacked domestic options. Executive Outcomes, a South African firm founded in 1989, is often cited as the first true modern PMC, providing combat support to the Angolan and Sierra Leonean governments before disbanding in 1998 amid growing international scrutiny. Around the same time, firms like Sandline International and DynCorp began operating in similar spaces, blending logistics, training, and combat-adjacent roles.

The 2000s saw firms such as Blackwater -which is now Academi-, DynCorp, and Triple Canopy grow promptly through extensive involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, whereas also expanding into peacekeeping-adjacent roles such as guarding aid organizations and infrastructure. This enlargement produced the industry's most consequential accountability scandal: in September 2007, a convoy of Blackwater contractors opened fire in Nisour Square, Baghdad, killing 17 civilians, triggering extreme scrutiny of legal accountability, contractor immunity, thus the role of private security in war zones.

6. Block Positions

6.1 States with major PMC industries

United States of America

The US is a host to the world's most developed and industrialized PMC industry. In historical means it is built around firms like Blackwater. However, today, Constellis operates in approximately 40 countries and combines the legacy capabilities of Academi, Triple Canopy, Centerra, and several other firms, employing approximately 22,000 personnel globally as of early 2025 and holding major State Department and Department of Defense contracts. Triple Canopy alone signed a \$1.3 billion agreement with the State Department in June 2022 to provide protective services to the US Embassy in Baghdad. Unlike Russia's or Turkey's models, the American industry operates within a formalized regulatory and contracting framework tied to DoD and State Department procurement.

Russia

Russia's PMC ecosystem is the most geopolitically significant of the state-aligned model, though it has undergone a major structural shift. After Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin's failed 2023 mutiny and death, the Kremlin absorbed Wagner's global assets into new, state-managed entities like the Africa Corps, operating directly under the Russian Ministry of Defense and the GRU, marking a shift from a decentralized, fee-for-service model to tight state control. Notably, Russian legislation formally bans the use of PMCs both abroad and domestically, a prohibition authorities simply overlooked because Wagner's African operations were so beneficial to Moscow. As of April 2026, the Central African Republic, Libya, and Mali host the largest Russian deployments in Africa, totaling thousands of personnel, with as many as 2,500 Russian personnel reportedly in Mali alone. The transition hasn't been seamless: battles involving Russian fighters in Mali dropped by more than 33% between 2024 and 2025 as the Africa Corps adopted a more hands-off posture than Wagner's.

Turkey

Turkey's flagship PMC is SADAT International Defence Consultancy, founded in 2012 by former Turkish Brigadier General Adnan Tanriverdi, a close ally of President Erdogan, and it functions as a quasi-official instrument blurring the line between state policy and deniable coercion. The firm has an explicitly ideological bent: it operates in nine African countries, particularly Libya, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel, espousing an openly Islamist worldview and recruiting Syrian mercenaries, many linked to human rights abuses, to fight in Libya, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In Libya specifically, SADAT maintained supervision and payment of an estimated 5,000 pro-GNA Syrian fighters, according to a Pentagon report

6.2 States reliant on PMCs

State reliance on Private Military and Security Companies (PMCs) represents a fundamental reshaping of national sovereignty, regional dynamics and international mechanisms for accountability. States most readily rely on these organizations in two specific forms: critical gaps in national defense capabilities; and strategic offloading, wherein a major or official casualty figures. For many developing nations that may be contending with active insurgency,

or collapsing institutions, PMCs offer an instant, turnkey means to secure tactical capabilities, vip protection and intelligence-gathering capabilities without years of capital-intensive investment in forming a standing army. This typically involves resource-for-security contracts where host states permit the PMCs to extract oil, diamonds or gold from their territory in direct payment for their security assistance.

This trend of increased state reliance can be clearly observed across the conflictscape that have characterised the early twenty-first century. In the CAR and Mali, the Wagner Group, now “Africa Corps,” has taken the place of traditional multilateral peacekeeping and foreign military assistance missions with direct kinetic action. Though these contracts have secured regime survival and control of key urban centers, these contracts have also facilitated the capture of state apparatus, lucratively extractives operations and extremely high reports of civilian death and injuries without any ensuing judicial processes.

Indeed, companies such as Executive Outcomes helped spearhead this trend back in the 1990s in Angola and Sierra Leone by exchanging military victory for territorial control over diamond deposits.

In other scenarios, in Western actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, widespread use of firms like Blackwater and DynCorp for logistics and convoy protection revealed crucial gaps in extraterritorial legal enforcement mechanisms particularly the 2007 Nisour Square incident, which established the potential accountability gap that exists in conflicts where private contractors are employed.

At the structural level, the subcontracting of core defense functions challenges the Max Weberian foundation of the state: its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Where the government hires profit-driven, privately owned organisations to conduct combat operations and security functions, national security ceases to be a public good and becomes a commoditized enterprise. As national governments begin to take for granted the reliance on external security forces, these states will inevitably experience a period of state capture.

They may intentionally underfund their national armies to avoid internal power bases that could challenge the regime in power, creating dependence on external forces that may prove permanent.

6.3 States with strict regulations and bans

Rather than regulating PMCs through licensing or export-control regimes, a smaller group of states had either banned mercenary activity instantaneously or enforced near-restrictive regulations on their citizens’ and companies’ participation in foreign military and security services. This approach is ingrained in two key international mechanisms: the 1977 OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa and the 1989 UN International

Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. The UN Convention's Article 1 aspires out the criteria for resolving mercenary status, Article 6 compels member states to legislate act so as to prevent mercenary recruitment, transit and financing, thus, Article 7 necessitates that violations to be subject upon severest penalties which includes in principle, capital punishment.

South Africa

South Africa demonstrates the clearest instance of a state moving from a permissive to a strictly prohibitive stance, caused by its own history with the mercenary firm executive outcomes. The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (RFMAA) was President Nelson Mandela's direct response to the involvement of South African mercenaries in Sierra Leone Civil War, furthermore it bans any South African from taking part in foreign conflicts unless authorised by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC).

South Africa addressed these and other shortcomings within the Act in subsequent legislation. In 2006 Parliament passed the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Countries of Armed Conflict Act. The 2006 Act updates national legislation on foreign military assistance and mercenary activity in a number of ways. First, mercenary activity is more broadly defined to include direct participation, recruitment, use, training, support and financing. Second, the Act distinguishes between two kinds of armed conflicts. The first is where a conflict 'in a regulated country is proclaimed as such'. A conflict in a regulated country is proclaimed by the President in the Government Gazette on the advice of the Committee. In addition, armed conflict is also defined to include conflict between different parties even in cases where no proclamation is issued. This would suggest that the government has broad discretion in regulating participation of South Africans in States that may have any kind of ongoing conflict within their territory.

Switzerland

Switzerland regulates rather than banning PMCs outright, though its framework is among the most restrictive in the world regarding direct participation in hostilities.

The Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad (PSSA) which is in force since 2015, demands companies intending to provide private security services from Switzerland to inform suitable authority (the FDFA) beforehand, and applies to any individual, legal organism, or partnership that establishes, runs or controls such a company from Switzerland. Vitally, the PSSA restricts any individual or entity within its field from undertaking activities for the purpose of direct participation in hostilities abroad. The Act's stated aims include safeguarding Switzerland's internal and external security, preserving its neutrality, and guaranteeing conformity with international law, particularly human rights and international humanitarian law.

China

China maintains a hybrid model: permissive domestic regulation paired with a strict, near-absolute prohibition on the use of force by its firms abroad. Chinese law prohibits Chinese private security companies (PSCs) from using force abroad, a restriction that does not apply domestically. Chinese law usually prohibits its citizens from carrying or using weapons on and off Chinese territory. China's existing legislation only covers PSC operations inside China, leaving firms operating overseas which is legally a grey area, furthermore China is not a signatory to the 2013 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, unlike Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which have all adopted substantial measures to regulate their PMSC industries and control mercenary involvement overseas.

PMCs and PSCs: Both PMCs and PSCs may provide services to both government and non-government clients, and both provide armed and non-armed services. One key difference, however, especially for Chinese PSCs, is that PMCs may be used to train military forces or to augment combat operations, while PSCs are used primarily for non-combat missions such as personnel protection and site security. However, by the nature of their work, both PMCs and PSCs may be engaged in violence as part of an armed conflict, though this may occur unintentionally.

The distinction between PMCs and PSCs is particularly important in the Chinese context. China exerts strict control over its security sector, dictating limits on the scope of military and security services its private companies can carry out domestically and abroad. This key difference separates Chinese PSCs from other PMCs—including Russian PMCs, which are known to have provided direct support to Russian and partner combat operations. By contrast, Chinese private companies have not yet engaged in direct support to partner force operations. While China explicitly forbids PMCs, China legalized PSCs in September 2009. Since then, Chinese PSCs have rapidly proliferated, increasingly obscuring the line between security and military services.

Belgium

Belgium is situated alongside states with laws particularly prohibiting mercenary activity and recruitment, reinforcing its position within the stricter side of the European regulatory spectrum on this issue.

7. Transparency, licensing, and registration regimes

Even setting aside the unresolved question of a binding UN convention, a patchwork of transparency, licensing, and voluntary registration mechanisms has developed over the last two decades, and delegates should be familiar with all of them, since most resolutions likely to emerge from this committee will build on, rather than replace, this existing architecture.

The Montreux Document (2008)

Convened by Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Montreux Document is the single most important reference point in this area, even though it is explicitly not a treaty and creates no new binding legal obligations. Rather, it restates existing obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law as they apply to states in three roles: as a state contracting a PMC, as a state on whose territory a PMC is operating, and as the state in which a PMC is incorporated or headquartered (the "home state"). It then lays out a set of good practices — licensing standards, vetting procedures, contract-drafting recommendations — that participating states voluntarily commit to following. As of the most recent tally, over fifty states have endorsed the document, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and, notably, both China and several African states with significant PMC exposure. Russia has not endorsed it, which delegates representing or opposing Moscow should be prepared to raise.

The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) and the ICoCA

Launched in 2010 as a voluntary industry-led initiative, the ICoC sets out a code of conduct for private security companies covering the use of force, detention, and the treatment of civilians, and was signed by a large number of major firms, including several of those discussed in Section 3. In 2013 signatories established the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA), based in Geneva, to provide independent oversight, certification, and a complaints mechanism for alleged violations by member companies. The ICoCA's central weakness, which delegates should understand clearly, is that it is entirely voluntary: a company can simply decline to join, or can withdraw if it finds certification inconvenient, and the Association has no power to compel compliance beyond removing a firm's certification and publicising that fact.

Financial and insurance-sector levers

A less obvious but potentially significant lever that has drawn growing attention from researchers, though it remains largely untested as a formal policy tool, runs through the financial and insurance sectors that PMCs depend on to operate. Like any other commercial enterprise, PMCs need banking relationships, war-risk insurance for their personnel and equipment, and, for publicly traded parent companies or investment-backed firms, continued access to capital markets. Some researchers and a small number of advocacy organisations have proposed that due-diligence requirements analogous to those used in anti-money-laundering and conflict-minerals regulation could be extended to banks and insurers doing business with PMCs, effectively using access to finance as a lever to enforce compliance with the ICoC or an eventual binding convention, in much the same way that

sanctions regimes already use access to the international financial system as an enforcement tool in other contexts. No state has yet implemented such a requirement in a binding way, and the practical obstacles are real: distinguishing a security-services company's legitimate financing needs from financing that should be restricted, and reaching firms and their bankers across the many jurisdictions in which they may be incorporated or headquartered. Delegates interested in mechanisms beyond the licensing and prosecution measures more traditionally proposed in this space may find this an underexplored area worth raising in working papers.

Regional and multilateral responses

The African Union, given how much of the activity discussed in this guide is concentrated on the African continent, has taken an increasingly vocal position on PMC regulation in recent years, building on the foundation laid by the 1977 OAU Convention discussed in Section 2.3. The AU Peace and Security Council has repeatedly called for stronger continental coordination on foreign military presence, though it has struggled to translate that rhetoric into binding continental policy, in part because member states themselves are divided between those relying heavily on Russian or Turkish PMC support and those, such as several ECOWAS members, that view that same support with considerable alarm as a source of regional instability. ECOWAS, for its part, has cited the presence of Russian PMC personnel in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger as a contributing factor in its response to those countries' military coups, though the withdrawal of all three states from the bloc in 2024 has significantly weakened ECOWAS's practical leverage over the situation. The European Union has funded PMC-related monitoring and research through its various Africa-focused programmes without adopting binding regulatory measures of its own, reflecting the same reluctance to cede national authority discussed in Section 3.3. No equivalent regional framework currently exists in the Americas or Asia, despite significant PMC activity in both regions, which delegates from those regions may wish to raise as a gap in the current architecture worth addressing.

8. Human rights violations by PMCS

There are many reasons as to why PMCS violate human rights and these will be listed below:

Diffuse chains of command and the “attribution problem

Human-rights protection depends on clear command responsibility: who planned, ordered, or failed to prevent an abuse. With PMCs, the answer is rarely straightforward. Contractors answer to corporate managers, contract officers, and clients; they may even work alongside national forces while remaining outside the states' military justice systems. This diffusion fractures the link between unlawful conduct and a duty-holder. Even when a client state

exercises ‘overall control’, proving it is up to the standard required for legal attribution under international and domestic laws is difficult, especially in conflict zones. The result is predictable: victims struggle to identify the responsible party, while states disavow knowledge or claim non-involvement.

Jurisdictional patchwork and weak remedies

In theory, PMCs are bound by the law of the territorial state – i.e. the home state where they are incorporated, and the international humanitarian law (IHL) rules that bind all parties in armed conflict. In practice, enforcement is not linear. Territorial judiciaries may be weak, biased, or simply fearful. Home states also often lack extraterritorial criminal statutes or resources to investigate. Civil suits may also suffer from limitations due to immunities, forum non conveniens, or the opacity of corporate structures. Even when prosecutions occur, they are inconsistent, rare, and politically vulnerable. The high-profile Nisour Square convictions in U.S. federal court demonstrated that accountability is in fact possible, but subsequent executive pardons instead demonstrated how fragile the path to accountability can be. The lesson other such military contractors and clients may draw is that accountability is discretionary and reversible.

Contract opacity and perverse incentives

Most PMC contracts are confidential, drafted to achieve specific targets, and not aligned with human-rights consequences. Payment schedules may reward aggressive posturing rather than championing restraint, de-escalation, or community consent. Subcontracting further dilutes oversight; creating distance between the ultimate client and the person with a finger on the trigger, and obscures due-diligence obligations. Where contracts are embedded in resource deals – mining sites, transport corridors, energy infrastructure -security and commercial interests converge, and local populations encounter coercion and exploitation as a cost of extraction and economic growth.

Exploitation of Local Populations

The impact of PMCs on local populations manifests as both a humanitarian catastrophe and economic exploitation. Human rights abuses and sexual violence are frequently documented, including extrajudicial executions, torture, enforced disappearances, and systematic sexual violence (SGBV) against women and girls. Moreover, by offering highly capable military services for hire, PMCs lower the political cost of war for client states, thereby fuelling and prolonging conflict. Their presence often leads to the exploitation of local resources (mines, oil fields, labor), diverting wealth, deepening poverty, and perpetuating the cycle of violence and recruitment.

9. Draft convention on PMCS

The question of regulating private military and security companies is not new to the UN system, and delegates should treat this as an area with real institutional history rather than a blank slate.

In 2005, the UN Human Rights Council replaced its earlier single-expert mandate on mercenary activity with the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, a five-member body tasked with studying how modern PMSC activity affects human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination, and with drafting principles to guide state regulation of the industry. This Working Group produced the most serious attempt yet at binding international regulation: the Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies, finalized on 13 July 2009 and formally presented to the Human Rights Council in July 2010. Following this, the Council adopted Resolution 15/26 (October 2010), establishing an open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the elaboration of a binding international instrument, and a further revised draft text was circulated in Geneva in May 2011.

Crucially, the Working Group's chair was explicit that the draft's purpose was not to ban PMSCs, but to establish minimum international standards for licensing, oversight, and state responsibility, while affirming that states retain the obligation to investigate, prosecute, and provide remedies for abuses committed by contracted personnel.

The draft convention has never advanced to formal negotiation or adoption. Major PMSC home states and major client states, including the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia, have shown little appetite for binding themselves to a new oversight regime, and the draft is now generally treated by scholars as a statement of principles rather than a live legislative text.

Despite more than a decade of continued sessions under the OEIGWG framework, the draft convention has never advanced to formal treaty negotiation, let alone adoption or entry into force. Major PMSC home states and major client states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, have shown little appetite for binding themselves to a new international oversight regime, viewing it variously as an infringement on national sovereignty over defense procurement, an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy atop existing domestic contracting law, or, in the case of states that rely on the deniability PMSCs provide, a direct threat to strategic flexibility. As a result, the draft convention is now generally treated by scholars and practitioners not as a live legislative text on a path to ratification, but as an important statement of principles and a reference point for what a future binding framework might look like, one that delegates in this committee are, in effect, being asked to revisit and potentially carry forward.

10. Questions to be Addressed

1. How can private military companies be revised?
2. Should states be held legally responsible for human rights violations committed by PMCs operating on their behalf?
3. How can the UN increase transparency and accountability regarding PMC contracts, funding, and military operations?
4. How can states reduce their dependence on PMCs and strengthen their own national armed forces instead?
5. Should PMC contracts be subject to parliamentary or judicial approval before they can become effective?
6. How should the executives of crime-related PMCs be charged with the crimes they have been involved with?

11. Further Notes

Dear delegates of the F-DISEC committee, you ought not to confuse this committee and agenda item with the Call of Duty universe entirely. Yes the topic we thought about is from the CoD universe but PMCS are a legit thing in the real world just like in the CoD universe. Do not let this ruin your motivation as still some surprises may arise during the conference and before finishing we highly advise you to further research PMCS and the matters that are taken into hand during real life. This committee is still highly exciting and some parts of the CoD universe but the entirety of the procedure will be just like any other General Assembly committee you have attended throughout your MUN career. Please read the QTBA's also because they are a vital point of the committees' running because the motions you give, the topics you will debate about will be the QTBA's.

12. Lore of Call of Duty: Advanced Warfare

In 2054, six months after enlisting for the United States Marine Corps, Private Jack Mitchell and his best friend Private Will Irons are deployed on their combat assignment in Seoul, South Korea, in an effort to repel a massive North Korean invasion force. Assigned to Badger Squad with fellow Marines Sergeant Cormack and Private Jackson, the squad inserts by drop pod into Seoul but are thrown off course due to the North Korean's anti-air defenses. Badger Squad manages to regroup with friendly forces and are assigned to assist a demolitions team with the overall objective of destroying an enemy aerial launcher. En route they encounter an Atlas rescue team lead by elite operative Gideon, who informs Badger Squad of the enemy presence in the next area before moving on. Pvt. Jackson then comments on Will's relation to Atlas CEO Jonathan Irons and asks why Will never joined, with the later stating that he wished to serve his country instead of his father.

After fighting through the besieged city, Badger Squad locates the demo team, who were killed by the North Koreans, and decide to continue their mission. Being covered by Cormack and Jackson, Will and Mitchell proceed towards the Mobile Launcher and succeed in planting the demolition charge, although Will's arm is broken by a shutter panel and is unable to get free. Not wanting them both to die, Will sacrifices himself and throws Mitchell off the ascending Launcher, being killed in the ensuing explosion. Mitchell loses his left arm due to a

piece of shrapnel severing it but is saved by Sergeant Cormack, who promises to get Mitchell home. The mission is successful as the U.S. are able to repel the North Korean attack, but at a massive cost: 6000 Marines are killed.

Upon returning home to the United States, Mitchell is discharged from the Marines due to his injury and later attends Will's Funeral, where Cormack delivers an eulogy for his fellow Marine's bravery. After paying their respects to their fallen comrade, Cormack ensures Mitchell that he will support Mitchell through this ordeal, until they are interrupted by Jonathan Irons. While Cormack offers his sympathies to the grieving Irons, the latter offers Mitchell a place in Atlas, claiming that Will told him of the great soldier he was, and that he deserves to fight for an army as effective as he is. Mitchell accepts and is given a "second chance" in the form of a high-tech prosthetic arm. Mitchell then goes through training at Camp David, an Atlas facility in Virginia, to adjust to his new arm. During a simulation in which they must extract the U.S. President from a terrorist occupied house, Mitchell and fellow Atlas soldier Joker nearly succeed until Mitchell experiences a malfunction in his new arm and is beaten by Gideon, who shoots the simulated President and comments on Mitchell's sloppy performance.

Irons then arrives to receive a report new Mitchell's training, to which Gideon responds, "He's getting there, sir." Irons remains optimistic about Mitchell, informing Gideon that Mitchell's a good soldier despite his setbacks in Korea. Irons then offers Mitchell a tour of the facility, giving Mitchell the rundown of Atlas' success and how they have become a freelance superpower. Irons then drops off Mitchell and Gideon at the R&D Lab to get Mitchell's arm recalibrated. After getting his arm fixed, Mitchell is brought to both the gun range and the grenade course to check out the recalibration of his arm, meeting fellow operative Ilona on the gun range where she'll comment on Mitchell's shooting if he beats her score. Mitchell is then brought back to the simulator, where he, Gideon and Joker manage to successfully complete the simulation and is congratulated by Irons, who informs Mitchell that he is ready for some real work.

Three months later, Mitchell is given his first assignment with Atlas, to rescue the Nigerian Prime Minister, Samuel Abidoyo, from the KVA, a large anti-western, anti-technology terrorist organization. The president and a few other technologists are held hostage at a technology summit in Lagos, where the KVA's leader, codenamed Hades executes one of the hostages to assert his control of the situation. Assisted by Nigerian Army Captain Ajani, the team succeed in rescuing the hostages but soon discover that the KVA are not targeting the president, but a technologist who was attending the conference. They pursue the escaping KVA vehicles and recover the technologist, who is taken back to Atlas HQ on Irons' orders. Back in the quarters, Mitchell, Gideon and Joker celebrate their successful op until they are interrupted by Irons, who proposes they have a toast to a job well done. Informing his operatives that this mission has provided Atlas with wonderful opportunities, Irons makes the toast to his men in honor of their service.

Soon afterwards, the KVA launches a massive surprise attack on nuclear power stations all over the world. Mitchell, along with a massive Atlas quick-reaction force, is sent to retake a power plant in Seattle, Washington. After successfully reaching the control room, Gideon attempts to get the reactor levels under control but is too late, as the reactor has already gone near critical. Gideon refuses to leave until ordered by Atlas Command, who orders all forces to evacuate the area. Although their team member Carter is killed, Mitchell, Joker and Gideon manage to escape, but the reactor becomes critical and causes the facility to collapse. Soon, more nuclear plants around the world become critical, with 50,000 people dead as a result of the KVA attacks.

Four years later, the world has recovered from the attacks with the help of Atlas, which has provided aid and shelter to everyone affected and has now become the largest corporation in the world, effectively controlling a majority of the world's resources. Now one of Atlas' most elite operatives, Mitchell is deployed in Detroit along with Gideon and Joker to track down a KVA lieutenant, Dr. Pierre Danois, who has information on the whereabouts of Hades. Joined by fellow Atlas Operative Torres, the team use hover bikes to track down Danois at his last known location, a hospital in the ruins of Detroit, where they discover the bodies of several Atlas field scientists with their hazmat suits missing. Realizing that they've been working in disguise, Mitchell and Gideon proceed towards their target until Mitchell loses his footing on an unstable ledge, falling to the lower levels of the ruins and losing his weapon in the process. He is eventually able to regroup with Gideon and the team and track down Danois successfully. While extracting him, the team are sidetracked by a KVA ambush and are nearly killed until a group of cloaked soldiers intervenes and saves them. Telling the team that they will cover their escape, the soldiers' leader tells them to move until he is stopped by Gideon, who demands to know who the soldiers are. The leader simply retorts that it's classified and moves on. The team then manages to reach the Atlas base on their bikes despite being pursued by KVA forces.

Danois is then interrogated by Ilona, who manages to extract the intel that points to Hades being in Greece. Irons, now a member of the U.S. Defense committee, shares this intel with fellow U.S. officials despite their doubts of how solid it is. Wanting to catch the man responsible for chaos caused four years back, Irons proposes that he sends an Atlas team to finish this once and for all, but is chastised by the committee as they see it as committing an act of war despite Atlas being a private company. Irons then leaves with Mitchell and Gideon, wanting them to be on the ground in the next few hours.

Mitchell and Ilona locate Hades, and Mitchell shoots him using a WASP drone, but it is revealed to be a double. The double is rigged with explosives that go off after his death and almost wipes out the squad if not for his heroic sacrifice made by Drelick. The compound is soon swarmed by other KVA operatives and the remaining Atlas forces must fight their way out. The real Hades makes an attempt to escape, but Mitchell and Ilona stop him and, after a brief struggle, Mitchell cuts Hades' throat. As he is dying, Hades utters the words "Irons knows" and gives Mitchell and Ilona a storage device containing a recording.

With Atlas now at the height of their popularity due to killing Hades and effectively destroying the whole of the KVA, Mitchell and Gideon accompanying Irons at the Atlas headquarters in the thriving New Baghdad. Ilona shows Mitchell and Gideon the recording that Hades gave them, and it reveals that the technologist from Nigeria warned Irons of the KVA attacks on the nuclear reactors, but Irons executed the technologist and deliberately kept quiet about the attacks in order to make a profit from the aftermath. Gideon believes the recording is a fake, but Mitchell and Ilona attempt to flee the headquarters, only to be held captive by Atlas troops on Irons' orders. They are contacted by an unknown person who assists them in escaping captivity, and they escape New Baghdad. Their unknown assistant turns out to be Mitchell's old sergeant Cormack, who is now a Major and is the CO of an elite U.S. led multinational team known as the Sentinel Task Force, whose priority was previously to investigate the KVA attacks and prevent anything like it from happening again. However, once Atlas and Jonathan Irons grew in power, it became clear he and his company were the bigger threat, and the Sentinels are now investigating Irons and Atlas.

Mitchell and Ilona defect to Sentinel and, along with Cormack and Knox, infiltrate Irons' home in Bangkok to find intel on a mysterious Atlas operation called "Manticore". They find out that "Manticore" is a biological agent that only targets specific genotypes (those that are not registered on the Atlas database) and will not affect any Atlas personnel, meaning Irons can deploy it in the midst of a battle without risking harm to his own troops, while the opposing force is annihilated. They tag a cargo plane that is about to transport a large shipment of Manticore before pulling out.

Later, the Sentinel forces move in on the Atlas cargo plane and bring it down over Antarctica. As they are attempting to secure the Manticore, a large Atlas force ambushes from drop pods and recovers the Manticore. Cormack, Ilona and Mitchell manage to take out most of the Atlas soldiers, but are captured by Gideon and his squad. Gideon calls for evac before suddenly shooting his squadmates, Juarez and Michaels, and helping the remaining Sentinel forces dispose of the Manticore.

With Gideon now on the side of Sentinel, he is reunited with his old teammates once more. Gideon reveals where Manticore is being made - in an Atlas bio lab in Bulgaria. He and Mitchell infiltrate the lab and destroy it before escaping in an experimental Atlas hover-tank.

A month later, Jonathan Irons is inaugurated into the United Nations. He issues a speech effectively declaring war on the governments of the world, now obsessed with total domination and believing the world would be better off under Atlas. His first move is an attack on the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, which Sentinel forces attempt to repel. Unfortunately, they fail, and the Golden Gate Bridge is demolished over a U.S. Navy carrier, which is promptly boarded by Atlas forces. Mitchell and Gideon are among only a handful of Sentinel operatives to survive the attack, and are soon joined by Cormack and Knox, who help them in retaking the carrier and destroying the advancing Atlas ships.

With Atlas now officially at war with the world, U.S. forces close in on the Atlas headquarters in New Baghdad. Mitchell, Ilona, Cormack, Gideon and Knox are among the personnel involved in the attack, and they manage to defeat most of the Atlas forces in the area. With New Baghdad under siege and Atlas losing, Irons deploys Manticore, which wipes out all of the U.S. forces in the area, including Knox. Mitchell, Ilona and Gideon survive since they were once Atlas personnel and are thus unaffected by Manticore.

The three are captured and taken to an Atlas prison camp, where they meet up with Cormack. Irons meet the four in person and shoots Cormack in the leg before disabling Mitchell's prosthetic arm as revenge for him defecting from Atlas. Ilona and Gideon overpower their captors and rescue Mitchell and Cormack. Whilst escaping, they learn that Irons is planning to unleash Manticore strikes on military bases all over the world. They escape the camp after Mitchell commandeers an AST, but Cormack succumbs to his wounds and dies.

With little hope of taking New Baghdad and stopping Atlas, Mitchell and Gideon attempt one final, all-out frontal attack in a pair of AST suits, while Ilona guides them. They manage to infiltrate the Atlas launch center and destroy the Manticore missiles before they are launched. However, because they had to access the rocket from the launch vents and they were caught in the blast, Mitchell is in critical health, so Gideon has to carry him. Irons shows up and locks down their exoskeletons, rendering them unable to move, but refuses to kill them in an attempt to show that he still has some humanity left in him, still claiming that he was "saving the world from itself." and Gideon arguing, "Twisted fucks throughout history have used the same argument...". As he flees, Mitchell manages to escape his exoskeleton and catch up with Irons in his office at the top of the Atlas headquarters. After a brief struggle, Irons nearly falls off the edge of the roof, but grabs onto Mitchell's lifeless prosthetic arm and tries to convince him to pull him up to safety. Mitchell, unable to shake Irons off, severs his own prosthetic arm with a knife and watches as Irons falls to his death. As Gideon arrives to help Mitchell, he comments that Atlas is still at large and the war has only just begun.

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